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Bernard Stiegler’s ambition in this book – one very much in keeping with the 
combined philosophical rigour and situated activism of the Technics and Time series 
as well as his broader scholarly and “public intellectual” engagements – is to re-make 
the ground on which the theorisation of cinema as material, technical and historical 
phenomenon takes place. Realising this is critical to grasping the significance of 
Stiegler’s claims about the cinema, television and digital technologies, for, as we will 
see, these claims intervene in established positions concerning the media, 
globalization and contemporary technoculture. This re-making of the ground of 
theorising continues his relentless calling to account across the Technics and Time 
series of Western thought for what could be called its enduring technical blindspot. 
The three volumes (so far) do not cease to insist on a reconsideration of the originary 
dependence of human beings on technology. Everything is at stake, in Stiegler’s 
view, in this reconsideration today, when the increasing influence on cultures of the 
global technical system exacerbates the disorientation individuals feel toward 
themselves and each other, leading them toward a state of ‘ill-being’. The audio-
visual program industries are a key element of this tendency. 
 Stiegler argues in Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (1998) that 
what is essential to the human is precisely the lack of an essence. The human is 
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‘essentially in default’, always already in need of some technical prosthesis in order 
to survive, to prosper, to improve oneself, so as to realise one’s individual and 
collective goals (1998, 188). As such, the lack, the default of essence is paradoxically 
necessary (‘un defaut qu’il faut’) to the human conceived as essentially a being that 
lives to transform itself, to have/produce significance, to contribute to the ongoing 
development of the collective, and so forth (1998, 210). The technical prosthesis has 
always already supplemented the human being, making possible its becoming. 
Moreover, Stiegler argues that time itself as lived by human beings is constituted in 
and through this technical prostheticity. Both anticipation of the future and memory of 
a past not lived become possible with the advent of the tool. The tool is a kind of 
external memory of the experiences and knowledge of those who devised and 
refined it and passed it down. To use it is to anticipate the future resulting from its 
deployment, a future inherited from those past lives of which it is the crystallised 
exteriorisation. Stiegler draws the general conclusion from this that exteriorisation 
(the formation of the techno-cultural context of human sociality) and interiorisation 
(the processes of memorious consciousness, consciousness of self ‘in’ time) exist in 
what he calls, after Gilbert Simondon, a ‘transductive’ relation (1998, 163) That is, 
they are reciprocal, co-constitutive of each other, existing only in their relation. The 
‘who’ (genetic and ‘epigenetic’, experiential memory) and the ‘what’ 
(‘epiphylogenetic’, externally accumulated memory) invent each other in a 
‘recapitulating, dynamic and morphogenetic accumulation of individual experience’ at 
the basis of human history and cultural becoming and differentiation (1998, 177). 
 The cinema is a crucial component of the ‘what’ active in this co-inventive 
dynamic since the start of the 20th century. Technics and Time 3 focuses on it and 
the lineage of audio-visual technologies to which it belongs. This sustained 
consideration is prepared and anticipated by the analyses of photography, writing, 
digital technologies and the Husserlian ‘temporal object’ (to be examined below) in 
Technics and Time 2: Disorientation. Much of this work is resumed and extended in 
Technics and Time 3, which Stiegler notes in the preface is something of a 
reformulation of his general project that can be read autonomously (13) – although 
this reader would volunteer that familiarity with the first two books is an enormous 
advantage in tackling the complexities of the third. 
 Stiegler provides a premonitory summary of his project in Technics and Time 
3 several years in advance of its release, in the concluding comments of ‘The 
Discrete Image’, first published in 1995 and released in English in Stiegler and 
Crogan, Patrick (2006) ‘Essential Viewing’. Film Philosophy. v. 10, n. 2, pp. 39 – 54. <http://www.film- 40
philosophy.com/2006v10n2/crogan.pdf>. 
ISBN: 1466-4615 online 
 
Film Philosophy, 10.2 September, 2006 
 
Jacques Derrida’s Echographies of Television (2002: pp). He draws a 
correspondence between Derrida’s influential deconstruction of the opposition of 
speech and writing and an hypothesis of his own: that ‘life (anima – on the side of the 
mental image) is always already cinema (animation – image-object)’ (emphases are 
Stiegler’s, 2002, 162) Technics and Time 3 elaborates this hypothesis and its 
implications. While it does so without substantial recourse to Derrida, this pre-
formulation of it has the value of highlighting the importance of his writings for 
Stiegler’s work, and perhaps above all his account of the paradoxical logic of 
supplementarity.1 In both cases something intuited as secondary (writing, cinema), 
coming later to imitate the primary entity (speech, life), an artifice produced by 
technical (that is, non-living) means, a supplement added to a self-sufficient 
existence, is put forward as somehow central, determining of what seemed to pre-
date it. A perverse game is played through this supplementary logic with the 
transcendental, idealist gesture that posits the enduring essence of things beneath 
the changes brought in the course of time. The ‘always already’ in the above quote 
from ‘The Discrete Image’ makes a quasi-transcendental play to outbid the implicit 
transcendental positioning of an essential ‘life’ over and above the temporal, 
technical phenomena of the cinematic apparatus and its productions. The stakes of 
this game are the understanding of life (at least, human individual and social 
existence), cinema and the transcendental gesture itself. This is what Technics and 
Time 3 is playing for. 
 In Chapter 1, ‘The Time of Cinema’, the quasi-transcendental play is made 
through an analysis of the cinema as a technical system that produces an experience 
of time. This experience, argues Stiegler, maps perfectly onto the dynamic of 
temporal engagement of the cinema spectator, so much so that it produces the well-
documented impression of reality and credibility capable of ‘capturing’ one’s 
consciousness for the duration of the film (31). The ‘coincidence’ of the time of film 
and spectator is a key element of the book’s propositions concerning the threat, to 
which we will return, posed by contemporary audio-visual programming (cinematic, 
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proceeding from and having recourse to the writings of Derrida, even if he 
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televisual and even more so ‘numerical’ or digital). The irregularity of this quasi-
transcendental analysis is signalled early on by Stiegler: ‘The analysis is that much 
more necessary because the singularity of the cinema reveals the singularity of the 
“human soul” as such: it exhumes techno-logically the “mechanism” of the “hidden 
art” in its depths’ (30). An account of what lies in the profound depths of human life 
reliant on a techno-logical hermeneutic appears to be anything but transcendental. 
Nonetheless, Stiegler’s account of cinema is carried out through a formulation of 
what unifies and is therefore essential to any or all concrete, realised instantiations of 
cinema, even if this transpires through the perverse reversal indicated above wherein 
life, or more specifically living consciousness, plays the role of being (in) the ‘image’ 
of cinema. More correctly, the perversity lies in the way Stiegler makes the one and 
the other swap roles, double as metaphor for the other, as vehicle for its 
‘transcendental’ formulation. For instance, he describes the ‘cinema’ which is  
produced ceaselessly by consciousness, which projects on its objects those 
which precede them in the sequence in which it inserts them and that it alone 
produces. In fact, this is also, in effect, the same principle as cinema: to 
arrange its elements into a sole and self-same temporal flux. (38) 
And further on he asserts that the ‘structure of consciousness is through and through 
cinematographic, if one calls the cinematographic in general that which proceeds by 
the montage of temporal objects, that is, of objects constituted by their movement’ 
(52, Stiegler’s emphasis). 
 If one calls the cinematographic in general’ montage, one can call 
consciousness in general cinematographic. Consciousness and cinema are in 
general montage, the one exemplifying the other’s transcendental generality and vice 
versa. This analysis of the cinema and consciousness as sharing in the generally 
cinematic characteristic of the montage of temporal elements is elaborated and 
legitimated by Stiegler through a detailed critical intervention in Husserl’s 
phenomenological account of memory in Logical Investigations. Stiegler discusses 
Husserl’s elaboration of two forms of memory, or retention, primary and secondary, 
operative in consciousness. He finds there a blindspot in Husserl’s account of 
memory, one which he attributes to the problematically transcendental ambition of 
phenomenology itself, an ambition which is obligated to exclude from the 
consideration of the essential nature of consciousness precisely what Stiegler 
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proposes as essential supplement to its constitution, namely, the technical supports 
of human memory of which the cinema is a singular instance. 
 The cinema is an instance of what Stiegler calls a mnemotechnology, that is, 
a technology specifically dedicated to the recording of experience, such as language, 
graphic art, writing, sculpture, ritual, and closer to its point of emergence, 
photography and the gramophone. The transductivity analysed in Technics and Time 
1 between interior consciousness and the exterior technical milieu which mediates its 
relations to other consciousnesses (and to itself) is already marked in the term, 
mnemo-technology. Stiegler insists on it in his account of cinema, taking Husserl to 
task for failing to think the mnemotechnological form adequately. Husserl proposes 
that two kinds of ‘retention’ are operative in consciousness. He distinguishes 
between these through a discussion of the difference between the audition of a 
‘temporal object’ and its subsequent recollection. While all objects are temporal to the 
extent that they are encountered in time, the term ‘temporal object’ specifies those 
objects which consist in a temporal duration, that is, those objects (of consciousness) 
which are constituted temporally. Husserl’s example is a melody. Stiegler resumes 
Husserl’s analysis of how primary retention works in the hearing of a melody to 
enable consciousness to apprehend the sequence of discrete sounds as a coherent 
entity (and not ‘noise’). In a melody, he explains, a ‘note only “sounds” through its 
rapport with preceding and following notes’ (37). Primary retention is the 
‘maintenance of the having-just-passed’ in the present of consciousness, so that at 
each moment of audition consciousness retains the previous note of the melody, it 
itself retaining the previous note, and so forth (37). This is what allows consciousness 
to constitute the temporal object via a dual retention and anticipatory ‘protention’ that 
at each moment of hearing projects the coherence of the melody based on these 
retained moments (and their protentions). The recollection of the melody at a time 
after it has concluded Husserl names ‘secondary retention’, one which occurs in 
consciousness via a dynamic operated by the imagination so that the memory is 
selectively recalled and reconstituted, that is, produced, in dialogue with all the other 
recollections ordered in and comprising consciousness as such, that is, 
consciousness as a continuity maintained beyond or beneath the temporal flux of 
immediate perception.  
 In effect, what Stiegler does is to ask Husserl where he heard this melody. 
Via an examination of the gramophone recording as a temporal object, Stiegler 
supplements Husserl’s two forms of retention with a third form, tertiary retention, and 
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in the process refigures the interplay of primary and secondary retention. Husserl, he 
points out, relegated external objects containing the record of experience to the 
category of ‘image-consciousness’ available to consciousness as perceptions but not 
intrinsic to its memory-structure (40). The gramophone, argues Stiegler, is a new kind 
of mnemotechnology that accomplishes something not previously possible, namely, 
the exact repetition of a temporal object. The audio recording reproduces exactly the 
original playing of the melody. This capacity is critical for Stiegler because it 
demonstrates that Husserl’s insistent exclusion of secondary retention (and the role 
of the imagination therein) from the pure perception of the object operative in primary 
retention cannot be sustained. This is made evident in the way that each listening of 
the recording (and in the same way each viewing of a film) is a different experience; 
one hears (sees) it differently, noting different aspects each time. In other words, the 
past experience of the recording must have influenced the current audition. This 
means that ‘secondary retentions inhabit in advance the process of primary retention’ 
(43). Perception of a temporal object, then, and by extension, of any object of 
consciousness perceived in time, is never ‘pure’, never free of the selective dynamics 
of the imagination, of selections based on the archive of all past memories. All 
perception is marked by the protentions emerging not only from within the present 
moment of perceiving – it is this that can no longer maintain itself in pure opposition 
to the past or the future in this analysis – but from the memories of past perceptions. 
This marking is a marking out of what to perceive from the totality of sense 
perceptions. In other words, all perception is always already a selective reduction of 
the total possible retention of the object of consciousness. 
 And what this reductive character of perception (as well as secondary 
retention) also indicates is that the archive of consciousness is constituted in the 
interplay of primary, secondary and tertiary retentions. While for Husserl these latter 
are artificial memories, not intrinsic to the workings of consciousness, but only its 
objects, Stiegler insists on tertiary retention as the sine qua non of consciousness as 
montage. The ‘archive’ is the fallible, finite, fragmentary, secondary memory of 
individual consciousness always already supplemented by the external record 
accessible through  
all forms of objective “memory”: cinematogram, photogram, phonogram, 
writing, painting, sculpture, but also monuments and objects generally, 
inasmuch as they testify to me about a past that I have not necessarily lived 
myself (54). 
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Memory is inside/outside the phenomenological subject, who must be rethought as 
not essentially the container of phenomena, but as a form (‘me’) that is originarily 
‘outside myself’ (84). Cinema, and the audio-visual technologies that come in its 
wake, are a major influence on consciousness because they form a vital part of this 
‘what’ that is outside. They have the capacity to impact on what people think at this 
structural level of the constitution of consciousness out of the flux of experience, 
experience which is itself realised and made possible in the milieu made possible by 
the ‘what’. Technical audio-visual temporal objects form an increasing proportion of 
one’s experience in the modern era, giving them an increasing potential to influence 
the nature and the ordering of retentions in consciousness, out of which come the 
protentional principles for selectively producing the primary retentions in an ongoing 
real-time montage of the present moment. 
 This influential capacity is built on an accumulation of abilities across the 
technical lineage of analogical representational technics, from photo to phonogram to 
cinema and beyond. The cinematographic apparatus, arriving shortly after the 
phonogram, combines this new ability to record temporal flux with what photographic 
technology accomplished through the capture of a past moment in time. This point is 
established by Stiegler with reference to Roland Barthes’s influential analysis of the 
perceived capacity of the photograph to elicit ‘spontaneous’ belief in the past reality 
of the ‘this has been’ seen in the photograph.2 The cinema ‘adds the dimension of 
duration’ to the photograph’s compelling power. On top of this, Stiegler argues, 
television adds two new ‘determinations’: 1. ‘Through the technique of broadcasting, 
it allows a mass public to simultaneously watch the same temporal object in all the 
points of a territory’ (62). This makes possible the constitution of ‘mega temporal 
objects’ (62), that is, the program schedules of television channels that Stiegler 
earlier describes as a kind of extension in time of the Kuleshov effect constitutive of 
cinematic montage in general (being the ‘demonstration’ of the principle that 
perception is always already projection, 38). 2. ‘As technique of capture and live 
retransmission, it allows this public to live collectively and in all the points of a 
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territory the event so “captured” at the very moment it takes place…’ (62). These two 
effects come to ‘transform the nature of the event itself and the most private aspects 
of the lives of the inhabitants of the territory’ (62). The numerical, analogico-digital 
technologies add a further level of transformative capacity to cinema and television, 
situated in part in the shift from broadcasting (and the regulation of cinematic 
production and distribution) to digital, electronic dissemination, and the resultant 
erosion of the regional and national groupings attendant on the ordering and 
regulation of network programming in particular ‘territories’. 
 Through this accumulating capacity to effect the ‘who’, cinema and the audio-
visual representational systems that flow from it assume an increasingly central role 
in the system of contemporary technoculture. This system, ordered by the logics of 
corporate capital, that is, by the logics of the amortisation of capital investment in the 
shortest possible time, coordinates industrial production generally (the production of 
goods and services for consumption) with the ‘program industries’ capable of 
accessing and soliciting the individual (as) consumer (61). Consciousness is the 
material in the market of marketing whose forum is the program industries: ‘In the 
industrial development of culture it is consciousness itself which is for sale’ (122). 
 Here the resemblance between Stiegler’s account of the ‘program industries’ 
and those accounts of media and culture in the era of capitalist modernity (and post-
modernity) should be evident. In particular, one can see parallels with the general 
tenets of the hugely influential formulations of Louis Althusser concerning culture and 
ideology, its passage into film and then cultural/media studies via the work of 
‘apparatus theory’ (Jean-Louis Baudry, Christian Metz) and Anglo-American cine-
semiotic film theory of the 1970s. Beyond the disciplinary and theoretical differences 
between the conceptualization of the subject-in-ideology and the intentional 
consciousness of phenomenology that Stiegler adopts from Husserl, the parallels 
would be drawn on the basis of the assertion of a form of materially exterior 
‘conditioning’ of human interiority operative through these technologies of 
representation. Stiegler is not unaware of this similarity, even if he does not address 
these particular theorists of film and culture in his book.3 He does, however, discuss 
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the related and equally influential work of the Frankfurt School theorists, Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, on the ‘culture industries’, making an explicit parallel 
between their work and his account of the program industries. In Chapter Two, ‘The 
Cinema of Consciousness’, Stiegler resumes their argument in The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment concerning the increasing regulation of cultural life outside of work 
hours in the era of industrial modernity through the industrialisation of cultural 
production so that all aspects of social and cultural existence become subject to 
commodification. In their reliance on Immanuel Kant’s notion of the scheme in their 
positing of the external schematization of thought produced by the culture industries, 
however, Stiegler identifies the persistence of the metaphysical ‘technical blindspot’ 
in their work, something which inhibits the critical potential of its account of culture – 
and, by implication, those related accounts of the ideological conditioning of subjects 
in and through the productions of the dominant, mainstream film and media 
industries. On this point, the idealism subtending Jean-Louis Baudry’s famous 
‘materialist’ account of the cinema’s functioning as an ideological apparatus—no 
more evident than in the ambiguous role played by Plato’s cave in Baudry’s 
‘Ideological Effects of the Cinematographic Apparatus’—would be so implicated. A 
materialist and ‘scientific’ knowledge of the cinematic apparatus is presented there in 
and as an idealist, that is, transcendental, conception of knowledge that would be 
capable of escaping ideology. Plato’s cave works both to figure the deluded state of 
the subject-spectator in ideology and, therefore, to position Baudry’s materialist 
account of that state of delusion as a theoretical exiting from the cave. The impasse 
of experimental film practices inspired by such critical accounts, what David 
Rodowick called (in his book of the same name) the ‘crisis of political modernism’, is 
due in no small part, I would argue, to this inbuilt contradiction of materialist 
theorisations of the cinema which hampered critical and practical interventions in 
dominant cinematic practices.4
 Stiegler goes back to Kant in order to set the scene for a ‘new critique’ of the 
culture industries (84). He traces the concept of transcendental schematism in Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason back to the notion informing it, namely, that of the ‘triple 
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extending the earlier analysis of Kant’s work on the mechanics of reasoning toward 
the (divine for Kant) origin and end of reasoning as such. 
4 Rodowick develops insightful criticisms of the work of Baudry and other theorists of 
the cinema’s ideological workings for their reliance on a naïve opposition of 
code/deconstruction, as if a critical decoding practice could simply undo the 
mystifications of coded positionings of the subject in institutional practices of 
signification and access some realm free of coding as such. (see Chapter 3 of The 
Crisis of Political Modernism). 
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synthesis’ of apprehension, reproduction and recognition developed therein. Briefly, 
Stiegler maps Husserl’s primary and secondary retention, along with his own tertiary 
retention, over Kant’s apprehension, reproduction and recognition, indicating how (as 
with Husserl) the constitutive role of technics haunts Kant’s elaboration of the 
‘transcendental’ form of consciousness. In Kant’s analysis, the achievement of the 
‘triple synthesis’ of these three processes of consciousness results in the 
understanding arriving at the ‘unity of apperception’ of the object (79). Kant’s analysis 
of the synthesis of reproduction (memory) cannot, however, argues Stiegler, detach 
itself coherently from the synthesis of apprehension (perception), something which 
Stiegler argues is symmetrical with Husserl’s difficulty in keeping primary and 
secondary retention separate. Because the synthesis of recognition emerges in 
Kant’s argument from an a priori unity of the phenomenon under consideration with 
the precepts of the consciousness seeking to understand it (the ‘transcendental 
affinity’ (78) of mind and its objects in the world), the confusion of apprehension 
(perception) and reproduction (memory) troubles the legitimacy, that is, the 
‘transcendentality’ of the understanding arising out of this ‘triple synthesis’. 
 The core of this problem of transcendentality lies with the tertiary memory 
form ‘outside’ the interior core of human understanding but also intrinsic to it. Stiegler 
‘proves’ this in a brilliant deconstructive reading of Kant’s explanation of the 
mediating function of the schema in the attainment of the unity of apperception. The 
‘transcendental schema’ (Kant’s term, 85) appears in the revised version of the 
Critique, precisely, argues Stiegler, to attempt to resolve the difficulties in 
establishing the transcendental nature of the process of consciousness. The schema 
is a third term, says Kant, standing between the categories of understanding (the 
transcendental concepts) on the one side and the phenomena of consciousness on 
the other, making possible the recognitive synthesis and the arrival at the unified 
apperception of phenomena (85). The schema’s goal, Stiegler cites Kant, ‘is not a 
particular intuition, but the unity in sensibility’ (85). But whence comes the schema, 
asks Stiegler, if not from particular intuitions of objects of consciousness, recorded, 
retained, accumulated and available to consciousness ‘a priori’, always already 
conditioning the individual’s intuition and understanding? Is not the understanding at 
work in each moment of consciousness a kind of film-making, he suggests, with 
apprehension, reproduction and recognition being the coordination of the processing 
of ‘rushes’ and ‘inserts’ in an ongoing, synthesising montage, determined in its single 
and self-same form by the exercise of criteria of selection and combination 
conditioned by the experience and understanding recorded in the ‘films’ (books, 
Crogan, Patrick (2006) ‘Essential Viewing’. Film Philosophy. v. 10, n. 2, pp. 39 – 54. <http://www.film- 48
philosophy.com/2006v10n2/crogan.pdf>. 
ISBN: 1466-4615 online 
 
Film Philosophy, 10.2 September, 2006 
 
images, and all kinds of other recordings) already made available to consciousness 
(79)? The appearance of such a mediating schema would be conditional on and 
reciprocal with the exterior reproductions of the flux of consciousness in all the forms 
of tertiary memory (78).5
 The schema cannot be maintained in this position between the pure 
abstraction of the a priori categories of the understanding and the particularities of 
worldly phenomena. To do so, Stiegler suggests, is tantamount to positing a kind of 
magical, secret origin to the unity of apperception (110). This unity (of 
consciousness) is, in Stiegler’s analysis, always projected, anticipated, but never pre-
ordained. If the process of the synthesising of retentions and protentions that is 
thought retains some mystery, then this must be addressed not as transcendental, 
‘beyond’ material, historical, factual existence, but as a mystery concerning what is 
given to consciousness, by the technical milieu in which it always finds itself, of the 
understanding of experience it has not itself necessarily lived. The ‘magic lantern’ of 
consciousness that projects a unifying light over phenomenal diversity must be 
thought transductively as figure (of the schema) of thought and the technology 
allowing consciousness to be so thought, that is, schematised (96). Likewise with the 
cinema: ‘In other words,’ says Stiegler, ‘the elementary rules of capture, montage, 
mixing, direction and post-production and projection of flux are the categories [of 
understanding]’ (114). Without this schema of the elementary rules of the cinema, the 
categories of thought await their quasi-transcendental re-cognition. 
 Such schematisations are, however, always (with) us. The impact of the 
schematisations of thought produced by the culture industries is possible because 
selections must be delegated by consciousness, ‘and have always already been 
delegated, to the ascendants one inherits by adopting their past experiences as 
one’s own…’ (113). The ‘durable delegation’ that is sociality is founded on the 
‘absolute credit’ given to these past experiences, a kind of ‘unconditional belief’ that 
the program industries are capable of mobilising in their efforts to coordinate 
production and consumption (113). It is critical, Stiegler argues, for the development 
of a ‘new critique’, first and foremost of critical thinking, to interrogate the implications 
of this quasi-transcendental basis of sociality and culture situated in the technical 
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milieu.6 Adorno and Horkheimer fail to do so, proposing instead that the culture 
industries had ‘deciphered’ and mechanised the secret principle of schematisation 
that Kant had proposed (68). The critical and cultural theory that followed in its wake 
shares largely in this shortcoming.7
 The remainder of Technics and Time 3 can be understood as taking a series 
of steps toward the laying out of the terms of this new critique in the face of the ‘ill-
being’ that Stiegler argues is growing out of the accelerating industrialisation of 
culture globally.8 This ill-being is characterised in Chapter 3, ‘The American Politic of 
Adoption’, as a ‘pollution’ of the reciprocal dynamic through which individual and 
cultural development takes place (167). Stiegler parallels well known accounts of the 
centrality of American capitalist modernity in the processes of globalisation when he 
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6 Stiegler will advance the term ‘atranscendental’, cautiously, in a footnote in which 
he promises to say more about it in the forthcoming volume in the Technics and Time 
series, to describe his project’s philosophical positioning as ‘neither empiricist nor 
transcendental’ (129). 
7 Stiegler attacks (and this is no overstatement) Pierre Bourdieu’s On Television as 
exemplary of this failing of critical thought before the major forms of audio-visual 
technology (131-138). Walter Benjamin’s meditations on reproduction are, however, 
cited here as a significant exception in the German school, and Stiegler returns to 
Benjamin in the final chapter in order to reformulate the terms of this ‘new critique’ as 
a thinking of re-production as ‘repro-duction’, that is, as the creation of something 
new in the very act of reproducing the already (re)produced (311). Given his 
engagement with Benjamin, it is intriguing that Stiegler does not address Benjamin’s 
meditations about the cinema explicitly in his own account of it. I’m thinking here in 
particular of Benjamin’s idea in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’ of the ‘distracted’ mode of engagement with the cinema as opposed to 
the contemplative mode of encounter with painting. The comparability, indeed the 
compatibility, of this idea of distracted perception with Stiegler’s argument about the 
‘capture’ of consciousness by the cinematic temporal object seems to me to be a 
question worth pursuing. While the latter seems to suggest an experience like that 
proposed by psychoanalytic film theory, one of immersive psychic coupling with the 
cinema projection system, Benjamin proposes (as commentators such as Susan 
Buck-Morss and Miriam Hansen have noted) a more psychically detached, but 
physically embodied encounter with the film image – at least as its intrinsic critical 
potential, however circumscribed by Hollywood’s employment of the ‘artificially’ 
auratic star system and its adoption of the immersive narrative forms of bourgeois 
literary tradition. The fact that ‘The Discrete Image’ adopts a distinctly Benjaminian 
flavour in positing the analytical critical possibility opened up by the digital image’s 
appropriation and indetermining of the photograph’s perceived impression of reality, 
suggests that this question has a history and a future. 
8 The translation of ‘mal-être’ as ‘ill-being’ is made with thanks to Daniel Ross and 
David Barison, whose film, The Ister (2004), includes lengthy segments of an 
interview with Stiegler and represents, among other things, one of the best overviews 
of his project available to the English-speaking (or subtitle-reading) viewer. ‘Mal’ in 
French also has the sense of ‘evil’ or ‘bad’, and this dual sense of diseased and evil 
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argues for the leading role of America in the ‘industrial organisation of adoption’. 
Identified as the key geo-political and philosophical theme today (190), ‘adoption’ is 
approached through a discussion of the work of Gilbert Simondon on the transductive 
relationship between psychic (individual) and collective individuation. As with the 
account of consciousness as cinematic, adoption is understood as a process intrinsic 
to individual and cultural becoming, through which the resources of the technical 
milieu (called ‘pre-individual’ by Simondon) are taken up as the conditions of 
individuation. America’s exceptional propensity to regulate and industrialise adoption 
is linked to its singular history, a history of diverse and competing colonial origins, the 
extermination/assimilation of indigenous peoples, and multiple waves of immigration, 
all in the absence of a coherent ‘projective apparatus’ (160) of national, communal 
identity (available to Europeans and to most of their colonial outposts). The 
advancing integration of all forms of representational mnemotechnologies in global, 
interactive information networks plays a determining role in the global dissemination 
and adoption of the ‘American way of life’, that is, the way of life as consumer (177). 
 The increasing influence of these program industries on processes of psychic 
and collective individuation worldwide leads to a new phase of the alienation of the 
individual from his/her material production that Marx analysed (137). Here, 
individuals are increasingly alienated from their thought (that is, from their process of 
individuation) through the confusion between primary, secondary and tertiary 
retentions arising from the increasing pre-emption of the first two by the mediatic 
programming of the latter (186). This tends to interrupt the ‘rhythm’ of the complex 
interplay between synchronisation and diachronisation at the heart of psychic and 
collective individuation (159). The adoption of the spatial and temporal coordinates 
held in common by the collective – which Stiegler names ‘calendarity’ and 
‘cardinality’ (183) – is the synchronising basis of identity, inasmuch as this adoption 
of a particular identity and history is what opens the possibility of one’s own 
diachronic individuation of that synchronicity. The hyper-industrial exploitation of the 
synchronising tendency of adoption tends to close off the individual’s diachronic 
potential. The result is a reactive ‘hyper-diachronic’ atomisation of the collective 
through a loss of investment and belief in the always already phantasmatic, 
projective synchrony of the collective.9 The evident and extensively analysed 
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being is active in Stiegler’s account of the dangers of the ‘hyperindustrialisation’ of 
individual and collective becoming. 
9 The term ‘hyper-diachronic’ is actually from a discussion of these themes in another 
text, To Love, To Love Oneself, To Love Ourselves: From September 11 to April 21, 
in which this process tending toward ill-being is re-examined, in a more generally 
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phenomena of globalisation and its discontents are symptoms in Stiegler’s account of 
this tendency toward hyper-diachronisation. 
 The remaining three chapters explore the crisis of education and the 
overturning of conventional notions of scientific knowledge in the ongoing advance of 
what Stiegler calls ‘technoscience-fiction’.10 The insights developed through the 
account of the cinematic character of consciousness, how it knows and orients itself, 
and the globalising processes its industrial exploitation has put in train are revised 
and extended in these chapters. I have no space left in which to venture even the 
kind of foreshortened summary I have provided of the first half of the book. One 
concluding point, however, should be made concerning the general tenor of Stiegler’s 
work in relation to the state of film theory today. While much recent scholarship on 
film and cultural production is intent on locating and theorising the conditions of anti-
hegemonic potential of various forms of production, Stiegler’s intervention in the 
thinking of cinema (and culture as material production generally) is aimed at 
rethinking the hegemonic as such. Consequently it focuses on and emphasises the 
hegemonic, globalising processes so powerfully at work in the reproduction of 
contemporary technoculture today. This does not mean, however, that his work 
should be taken as ignoring, or ignorant of, the possibilities of differentiation and 
resistance to the dominant tendencies influencing technoculture. On the contrary, 
what he calls in Technics and Time 1 the ‘idiosyncratic’ potential of individual material 
productions (film, text, artwork, software object, and so on) to reflect on, reconsider 
and recast the prevailing schematisations of existence ‘we’ have always already 
delegated to ‘ourselves’ is a structural component of the reproductive potential of 
human ‘nature’ understood as originarily technical and prosthetic (Technics and Time 
1, 199). His own readings of particular films and television programs in Technics and 
Time 3 (which I have not had time to engage with here) in order to elucidate his 
reflexions on cinema (not least for himself) bear this out.11 Stiegler’s project is best 
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accessible way, in terms of a ‘hyper-synchronisation’ having as its abreactive double 
a hyper-diachronisation tending to uncouple individuals from any sense of inherited 
communal potential. 
10 Part of Chapter 4, ‘Our Ailing Educational Institutions’, was published in the online 
journal, Culture Machine, although, inexplicably, only two thirds of the chapter are 
included in the translation. 
11 In terms of film and cultural theorisations of what eludes or remakes the 
hegemonic, I’m thinking, for instance, of work on reception studies, on subcultural 
stylistic appropriation of the mainstream, and of postcolonial theories of cinema as 
‘intercultural’ (Laura Marks), ‘accented’ (Hamid Naficy) and so forth. Here would be 
the building blocks of another account of Technics and Time 3, one focussing more 
on how it would impact on the theoretical tenets of such attempts to think the 
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understood, then, as a sustained effort to lay out the basis for precisely such 
aesthetic, conceptual and critical reinvention through a ‘new critique’ of the dominant 
tendencies of contemporary, hyperindustrialising technoculture capable of avoiding 
easy subsumption or recuperation by its immense adoptive capacity. 
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